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PEERING INTO THE FUTURE: KOREA’S RESPONSE TO THE NEW TRADING 
LANDSCAPE
By Troy Stangarone
As the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century nears an 
end, distinct patterns are emerging in the global trading 
system. The Doha Development Round remains stalled 
and has begun to raise questions about countries’ abil-
ity to reach meaningful trade liberalization under the 
current multilateral structure. At the same time there 
has been a quickening of the pace in the development 
of bilateral trade deals, especially in Asia.
While economists rightfully argue that the multilateral 
system yields the most gains for all countries, that 
position tends to underplay the political reality that for 
each country the greatest gains in trade liberalization 
come from realizable yields and through agreements 
that a country can realistically expect to conclude.
Before 2003, Korea had no free trade agreements 
(FTAs) and was committed to the multilateral system. 
Today it is negotiating or considering negotiating FTAs 
with the European Union, China, Japan, Australia, 
India, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
among a wide range of states and regional groupings. 
Although Korea is still committed to negotiating mul-
tilaterally, it has undergone a signifi cant shift toward 
complementing that strategy on the bilateral level. 
This paper will explore the changes in Korea’s FTA 
policy under President Roh Moo-hyun and its likely 
prospects under the administration of President Lee 
Myung-bak.
Changing Landscape of Trade
Preferential trading agreements have long been part of 
the international trade agenda, but since the postwar 
trading system was developed they had primarily 
served as secondary pieces to a larger puzzle. When the 
United States pursued its fi rst FTA with Israel, it did so 
with the intent of providing momentum to the ongoing 
multilateral negotiations of the time. Multilateralism 
was the primary driving force of trade liberalization. 
That has changed.
Today, 55 percent of world trade takes place through 
FTAs.1 In addition, all of Korea’s major trading part-
ners have begun engaging in more bilateral FTAs 
(Table 1) although the EU’s move in this direction 
has come only since the end of 2006. In recent years, 
the United States has negotiated nine FTAs aside 
from the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS 
FTA), with negotiations still ongoing with Malaysia. 
Japan has either negotiated or proposed eleven FTAs, 
not including one with Korea, while the number for 
China is nine. Included in China’s and Japan’s lists of 
prospective FTA partners are regional trading blocs 
such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and the GCC, key emerging markets such 
as India, and developed markets such as Australia. 
Between 2002 and 2006, the number of FTAs in the 
Asia Pacifi c alone tripled to more than 175.2
This is the new landscape that Korea’s decision makers 
face. Economists refer to this proliferation of FTAs 
as a suboptimal “spaghetti bowl,” where a series of 
overlapping agreements produce lower-level results 
than one overarching agreement could. However, 
the bilateral FTA route holds certain advantages for 
an individual country, specifi cally one like Korea. 
Multilateral negotiations entail a lengthy period of ne-
gotiations, but bilateral agreements can be concluded 
and implemented in a relatively short period of time. 
Within a bilateral framework, a broader range of issues 
can be addressed, and liberalization can be taken to a 
deeper level than occurs in multilateral negotiations 
where the needs and concerns of a broader range of 
nations are factored into any fi nal agreement.
1. Jeffrey Robertson, “The Price of Free Trade,” Asian Times, 12 July 2005.
2.  “We Can’t Stand Still: The Race for International Competitiveness” (Washington, D.C.: Business Roundtable, March 2007), 
www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/Intl_Trade_Investment/We_Cant_Stand_Still_2007.pdf.
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Table 1: FTAs Concluded, Currently under Negotiation, or  
Proposed since 2000 by the European Union, China, and Japan 





























Note: ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations,  
EFTA = European Free Trade Association, EU = European Union,  
GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council, MERCOSUR = Mercado  
Comun del Cono Sur (Southern Common Market), 
SACU = Southern African Customs Union. 
Perhaps more important, in bilateral negotiations 
the partner nations have signifi cantly greater say in 
the ultimate designs of the agreement. Although the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) currently has 151 
members, the heavy lifting of the negotiations is 
conducted by the United States, the EU, Brazil, and 
India, with these parties representing larger group-
ings of parties within the WTO. Under a bilateral 
framework, Korea can tailor an agreement to its needs 
in terms of offensive and defensive interests with its 
trading partners.
Korea’s Hub-Based Goals
Korea has aspirations to become a fi nancial and logis-
tics hub of Northeast Asia. Less discussed is its goal 
to become the FTA hub of the region as well. While 
these might seem like separate goals, they actually 
complement each other. For Korea to become a hub 
in Northeast Asia, it will need to develop the transpar-
ency, consistency, and the ease of access that will allow 
goods and services to fl ow freely and seamlessly in 
and out of the Korean market; to achieve this, Korea 
needs to resolve lingering concerns about disputes 
such as that arising from Lone Star’s sale of Korea 
Exchange Bank.
Korea’s FTAs can help to expedite its ambitions to 
become a hub in Northeast Asia. One of Korea’s stated 
goals in negotiating the KORUS FTA was to aid in 
liberalizing its fi nancial services sector in an effort to 
increase competitiveness and import global standards. 
Korea’s FTA with the EU undoubtedly will help to 
further this goal as well. As Korea opens its market 
and adopts international standards, it will become an 
attractive market from which to do business in the 
region on account of its strategic location between 
China and Japan.
FTA Strategies
Each country has its own strategy, reasons, and 
goals when it pursues a free trade agreement. When 
developing an FTA policy, individual nations or re-
gional trading blocs often pursue goals beyond trade 
liberalization. These can include foreign policy and 
security considerations, competitive considerations, 
preferential access to markets and resources, strategic 
export considerations, and internal domestic economic 
reforms among a range of others. This wide range of 
goals and considerations can be seen in the policies 
pursued by Korea’s main trading partners: the United 
States, the EU, China, and Japan.
When Robert Zoellick was the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative, the United States began pursuing a policy of 
competitive liberalization. The intellectual framework 
behind competitive liberalization was that, if the 
United States pursued liberalization on the multilat-
eral, regional, and bilateral levels, it could advance the 
overall cause of global trade liberalization by spurring 
other nations or trading blocks to do the same, with 
the eventual outcome being the knitting together of 
various trade pacts to create a broader, more open 
global trading system.
During Zoellick’s tenure as the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, the United States also began to ground its trade 
policy in broader economic, security, and foreign 
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policy aims. The outgrowth of this logic was a policy 
that focused on concluding FTAs with strategic part-
ners, including allies such as Australia and countries in 
strategic regions such as the Middle East. Historically, 
the United States has also used its FTAs to create new 
precedents for liberalization and templates for other 
nations to follow.3 The United States has continued to 
innovate on issues addressed in FTAs, such as in the 
10 May 2007 bipartisan agreement to include defi nable 
and enforceable labor and environmental standards.
In late 2006, the EU announced a new trade policy that 
shifted its focus from a sole reliance on multilateral 
negotiations to include bilateral and regional FTAs. 
The new policy of the EU Commission set up eco-
nomic criteria for EU negotiations that include (1) the 
market potential of a prospective partner, (2) the level 
of protection against EU exports, and (3) prospective 
partners’ negotiations with EU competitors.4 Under 
this new policy, the EU began considering the FTA 
policies of its competitors in addition to economic 
criteria when choosing potential trading partners. The 
movement to bilateral FTAs also allowed the EU to 
address areas such as services to a degree that would 
not have been possible at the multilateral level.
In contrast, Japan’s FTA policy focuses more on 
maximizing the strengths of Japan’s economy. When 
considering FTA partners, Japan focuses on negotiat-
ing with partners that complement its economy and 
that advance the interests of its companies. Because 
Japan’s FTAs focus on its economic strengths, they 
tend to exclude agriculture to a signifi cant extent. In 
Japan, as in many nations, agriculture is a politically 
sensitive issue. It was Japan’s reluctance to include 
agriculture in a substantively meaningful way that led 
Korea to suspend its FTA discussions with Japan.
Although economic concerns are often the basis for 
FTAs, political considerations sometimes dominate. 
China’s policy on FTAs is a prime example. When 
China began to pursue FTAs in Southeast Asia, it did 
so for political reasons, not economic ones. As China 
has grown in economic strength, it has at times expe-
rienced friction in its relationship with its neighbors. 
Although these concerns are often rooted in anxieties 
related to China’s past as well as to legitimate concerns 
over the implications of China’s growing economic 
might and development, they do represent a signifi cant 
foreign policy concern for China. As a means of mini-
mizing these concerns, China has adopted a policy of 
using FTAs to build political relationships that help to 
ease these regional tensions. Another goal of China’s 
trade policy is to diversify its trade and reduce its 
dependence on the West,5 while it also seeks greater 
access to the immense amount of resources it needs 
to power its continued economic growth.
As the FTA policies of Korea’s key trading partners 
demonstrate, many potential considerations go into 
formulating an FTA policy, on both the political and 
economic levels. Before considering the overall re-
sponse and implications of Korea’s policy, we should 
consider Korea’s offi cial FTA policy:
First, Korea aims to pursue FTAs with large 
advanced economies or economic blocs and 
promising emerging nations.
Second, Korea aims to pursue FTAs that are 
high-level in terms of the degree of liberaliza-
tion and comprehensive in terms of coverage 
and scope.
Third, Korea adopts a multi-track approach 
when negotiating FTAs, meaning that the nego-
tiations can be carried out simultaneously with 
more than one country when necessary.
3. Robert Zoellick, “Unleashing the Trade Winds: A Building Block Approach.” U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda 8, no. 1 (August 
2003), http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0803/ijpe/pj81zoellick.htm.
4. “Global Europe: Competing in the World” (Brussels: European Commission, n.d.), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/
october/tradoc_130376.pdf.
5. Chu Shulong, “China’s Approach to the Free Trade Area” (presentation at “Free Trade and East Asia,” meeting held by Foreign 
Policy Research Institute and World Trade Center of Greater Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pa., 2006), www.fpri.org/pubs/20061102.
chu.chinafreetradearea.pdf. 
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Additionally, in order to achieve national consensus as 
part of the negotiation process, Korea aims to pursue 
a wide range of outreach efforts with the public and 
private sectors.6
However, if one digs deeper and considers Korea’s 
choices and constraints, one can see a series of pat-
terns begin to develop, some of which refl ect aspects 
of its partners’ FTA policies as well. Korea is gener-
ally acknowledged to have one of the higher FTA 
standards in terms of economic liberalization, which 
substantively covers all areas of trade, with rice being 
the one signifi cant exception.
A Doha unto Itself
In sports, depth is often a key to any championship 
run, while in business, politics, or any other endeavor 
having a backup plan is a key part of long-term suc-
cess. The Doha round was conceived as a development 
round that would focus on liberalization in agriculture. 
The nearly universal political sensitivity of agricul-
ture has been one of the constraints holding back the 
round’s progress.
Although Korea stands to gain from liberalization in 
agriculture because it has some of the highest food 
prices in the world, being a net importer of food means 
that Korea has limited potential offensive interests in 
the round. This is where Korea’s FTA policy comes 
into play. Should the Doha round ultimately fail to 
produce an agreement or produces a minimalist agree-
ment that addresses little in terms of manufacturing 
or services liberalization, Korea’s FTA policy will 
have provided it a means by which to address these 
defi ciencies at the multilateral level.
Korea is a resource-poor county. Not only is it a net 
importer of food, but, because of its limited endow-
ment of natural resources, it imports many of the raw 
materials it needs to produce the fi nished goods it 
exports and the energy it needs to run its economy. To 
meet these needs, Korea requires an FTA policy that 
will not only spur greater economic competitiveness 
within its economy and provide it access to markets 
for its industrial goods, but it should also open mar-
kets that can supply needed resources and energy for 
Korea’s economy.
Although Korea could undertake unilateral liberaliza-
tion in regard to its natural resources requirements, 
which would likely entail minimal political costs 
in Korea, Korea would also be missing an opportu-
nity. Unilaterally reducing or eliminating tariffs on 
natural resources would be of clear benefi t to Korea’s 
economy, but doing so would not provide reciprocal 
access for Korea’s fi nished goods in those markets. 
By undertaking this process through a series of FTAs, 
Korea maintains the political leverage it needs to open 
up additional markets for its producers.
There are also domestic political gains for Korea in 
undertaking a piecemeal approach rather than waiting 
for multilateral liberalization or engaging in unilateral 
liberalization. When Korea began negotiating the 
KORUS FTA, one of its stated goals was to use the 
KORUS FTA to aid in liberalizing its service industry. 
As several academics have pointed out, Korea could 
achieve the same goal at a lower cost by unilaterally 
liberalizing its service industry. However, this ap-
proach does not take into consideration the domestic 
political costs of unilateral liberalization.
By tying the liberalization to its negotiations with the 
United States, Korea was able to achieve two important 
objectives. First, it was able to introduce competition 
into its service industry in a controlled manner, which 
will allow domestic providers a better chance to adopt 
international standards and techniques while adjusting; 
and, second, it lowered the domestic political cost of 
any reforms in the service industry by tying them to 
wider benefi ts in other parts of the economy.
As part of this process, Korea has completed, begun 
negotiations, or proposed negotiations with 19 other 
countries or regional groups (Table 2). In terms of 
Korea’s stated aims, its agreements with the United 
States, the EU, India, and others clearly meet its 
criteria of seeking out partners with advanced or 
6. “Korea’s FTA Policy,” Document no. 3 (Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 15 June 2007), www.mofat.go.kr/english/
econtrade/fta/issues/index.jsp.
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promising economies. Korea is considered to have a 
high standard for FTAs, and it is meeting its other goal 
by conducting multiple negotiations. Korea has also 
conducted a major educational outreach program to 
build domestic support for the KORUS FTA.
Korea’s FTA policy, however, clearly shows aspects 
that move beyond its overarching structure. These 
include political and security considerations, gaining 
access to the natural resources its economy requires, 
ensuring it has market access for key producers, and 
encouraging domestic economic reforms that are 
needed to keep Korea competitive in an increasingly 
dynamic world.
Strategic Foreign Policy Considerations
Foreign policy and international politics have always 
played a role in trade policy, with nations using trade 
pacts as parts of their alliances to strengthen their 
allies. Some modern-day agreements may be used 
to encourage reforms in allied nations, as the U.S. 
agreements in the Middle East are used, but the hard 
political reality is that it is politically easier to conclude 
agreements with allies. In the case of Korea, this aspect 
played a prominent role in the KORUS FTA. One of 
the stated objectives on both sides was to broaden and 
deepen an alliance that, although it has been a long 
and benefi cial one, has been generally acknowledged 
in recent years to be showing signs of strain. Shoring 
up this important alliance in a key part of the world 
was a prominent concern for both sides.
Market Access
The Korean economic miracle of the last half of the 
twentieth century occurred under an export-driven 
economic strategy, and, although Korea’s economy has 
undergone signifi cant liberalization, exports continue 
to play a signifi cant role in Korea’s economy. For 
export-driven industries to continue to fl ourish, Korea 
needs to ensure that its producers have market access 
at the best possible terms in key economies. As China 
continues to move up the production chain and Korean 
fi rms increasingly fi nd themselves in competition with 
China, this has become a more prominent concern. 
During the KORUS FTA negotiations, Korean offi cials 
and U.S. business interests continually stressed the 
loss of market share by both sides to China in their 
respective domestic markets, and they emphasized that 
the KORUS FTA was an opportunity to regain that 
market share. Only time and other market trends will 
determine whether this is the case, but it does underline 
the political need to ensure the best possible access in 
the world’s most attractive markets.
The United States remains the world’s largest con-
sumer market, and the EU is Korea’s second-largest 
trading partner. In a strategic sense, Korea has not 
experienced the same success in selling automobiles 
in the EU that it has in the United States, adding to 
the potential of a Korea-EU FTA. By concluding FTAs 
with China, India, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, Canada, 
and Mexico, Korea would have agreements with most 
of the world’s most signifi cant markets.
Import Effect
Among trade topics, imports have a negative con-
notation in the political discussion. From a political 
perspective, countries seek to enhance the ability of 
their industries to export products, while they strive to 
limit the ability of competitors to penetrate their mar-
kets. To successfully export heavy industrial products 
such as steel or high-tech products such as Samsung 
Table 2: Korea’s Free Trade Agreements, January 2008 
























Note: ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations,  
EFTA = European Free Trade Association, EU = European Union,  
GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council, MERCOSUR = Mercado  
Comun del Cono Sur (Southern Common Market),  
SACU = Southern African Customs Union. 
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phones, however, Korean fi rms must have access to 
the raw materials and energy needed to produce these 
products.
Korea has limited natural resources and is dependent 
on other countries to meet its energy, resource, and 
food needs. At a time when oil has quadrupled in price 
and other natural resources are at all-time highs, FTAs 
can serve as a means to both ensure access to available 
resources and reduce the costs to industry.
In light of Korea’s resource needs, it is not surpris-
ing to see nations that can play a signifi cant role in 
meeting those needs on Korea’s list of prospective 
FTA partners. Korea’s current FTA plans call for it 
to conclude FTAs with energy-rich nations such as 
Russia, the GCC, and Canada, while also concluding 
agreements with other resource-rich partners such 
as MERCOSUR, Australia, and the South African 
Customs Union. In addition, it would have FTAs with 
some of the world’s prime agricultural producers in the 
United States, Australia, and New Zealand.
Internal Domestic Economic Reforms
From the start of negotiations with the United States, 
Korea has been open about its desire to pursue do-
mestic economic reforms through its FTA with the 
United States. Of all of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, 
Korea has the least-developed service sector and a 
highly ineffi cient agricultural sector. One of the goals 
of the KORUS FTA has been to open Korea’s service 
industry, specifi cally the fi nancial services sector, to 
competition with U.S. fi rms in the hopes of further 
developing its service sector and encouraging for-
eign investment that would bring needed managerial 
knowledge to boost the sector’s international com-
petitiveness. An FTA with the EU, the world’s other 
leading service economy, would also clearly aid in 
advancing this goal.
By taking the bilateral trade route in addition to the 
Doha round, Korea will enable itself to better construct 
a trading system that meets the needs of its economy, 
while ensuring that it secures market access that will 
likely go beyond the liberalization of the Doha round 
in manufacturing and services. As the Doha round 
continues to stall, Korea is essentially pursuing a 
parallel trading system that meets its needs and aids 
Korea in reaching other domestic and political goals 
as it encompasses more than 90 percent of global GDP 
in its parallel system. This new Korean trading system 
has the added benefi t of allowing Korea to protect its 
rice industry as it moves toward greater overall lib-
eralization in agriculture, industrial goods, services, 
and investment provisions. This is a key component, 
for it would not be politically possible to push an ag-
gressive FTA agenda in Korea if the rice sector were 
to be liberalized. In the long run, however, the key for 
Korea will be to create a system with a set of largely 
similar agreements.
The Early Results on Korea’s FTAs
Because Korea did not conclude its fi rst bilateral FTA 
until 2003, it does not have a track record of a nation 
such as the United States on the benefi ts of bilateral 
FTAs. However, the early fi gures on exports to Chile, 
Korea’s fi rst FTA partner, have been especially strong, 
with exports increasing by nearly 50 percent or exceed-
ing it in the fi rst three years. Since the establishment 
of the FTA with Singapore, Korea has seen export 
growth to Singapore of around 25 percent per year. 
Trade with countries of the European Free Trade As-
sociation, for which Korea has FTA data for only one 
year, has not seen growth in Korea’s exports. While 
Korea’s FTAs have been successful on the whole, they 
have also provided Korea with valuable negotiating 
experience to prepare it for future negotiations with 
the United States. This is especially the case with Chile 
and Singapore, both of which already had FTAs with 
the United States.
A Different Type of FTA
One unique characteristic of many of Korea’s FTAs is 
their inclusion of the South Korean industrial complex 
in the North Korean city of Kaesong. The Kaesong 
industrial complex is an outgrowth of Korea’s policy 
of engagement toward the North. It is also a hard-
headed recognition of the fact that, should the regime 
in North Korea collapse or peaceful reunifi cation 
occur in the near future, North Korea’s economy is 
signifi cantly lagging in comparison with the South 
Korean economy. In light of the high level of disparity 
between the two nations’ economies, Korea initiated 
the Kaesong project, along with others, to begin the 
process of introducing aspects of a market economy 
into North Korea and beginning the work of reform-
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ing the North’s economy. The high costs experienced 
in the reunifi cation of East and West Germany have 
led South Korea to conclude that improving the North 
Korean economy may be the only means by which 
South Korea can bear the costs of reunifi cation, absent 
signifi cant sums of outside aid.
Although access for goods from the Kaesong indus-
trial complex was included in Korea’s initial FTAs, 
including this provision in additional agreements has 
led to political diffi culties. The KORUS FTA does 
not directly include access for goods from Kaesong; 
instead it includes provisions for a committee that 
will determine under which conditions goods from 
Kaesong would be permissible under the agreement. 
Even then, should those criteria be met, Korea’s Na-
tional Assembly and the U.S. Congress would need to 
approve an amendment of the agreement to include 
goods from Kaesong. The EU has also expressed res-
ervations about including goods from the complex in 
its deal with Korea.
Speed Bumps along the Road
Korea’s ability to conclude all of its proposed FTAs, 
should it ultimately pursue them, will largely rest on 
a wide range of factors. Negotiating an agreement is 
only half the process, as the KORUS FTA demon-
strates. Political constraints, in terms of the conces-
sions that Korea or its prospective partners can make, 
also impact the outcome of the deal and when it can 
be implemented.
With respect to the KORUS FTA, a series of inter-
woven political constraints hinder the agreement’s 
approval in the legislatures of both countries. Even 
before the agreement’s negotiation, disputes relating to 
U.S. beef and autos were the two most politically sensi-
tive issues. Although it is unlikely that the concerns of 
the U.S. auto industry and United Automobile, Aero-
space and Agricultural Implement Workers of America 
(UAW) regarding the agreement’s provisions on autos 
can be resolved, hope remains that an agreement can 
be reached on the resumption of both boneless and 
bone-in U.S. beef exports to Korea. Korea, however, 
faces vocal opposition from some domestic groups 
regarding the safety of U.S. beef. All of this is made 
more complicated by elections in the United States 
and Korea, which potentially limit the possibilities 
for passage, should the beef issue be resolved, to the 
fi rst half of 2008 in the United States and after Korea’s 
National Assembly elections in April 2008.
The EU negotiations, while ongoing, are largely tied 
up in some of the same concerns that the United States 
has regarding the level of openness in Korea’s auto-
mobile market. Negotiations with Canada have been 
drawn out, with autos also being one of the areas of 
contention. With a renewed push on both sides to fi nish 
the Korea-Japan FTA, its prospects will largely hinge 
on Japan’s ability to go beyond its previous position 
on agricultural liberalization unless the incoming 
Lee administration decides that the agreement is too 
strategically important in helping to mend relations 
between the two countries to let agriculture stand in 
the way. An agreement with China makes signifi cant 
strategic sense in regard to Korea’s aspirations to be 
a hub in Northeast Asia and in political and economic 
terms, but domestic concerns could arise over giving 
one of Korea’s primary competitors preferential ac-
cess to Korea’s market, especially because Korea’s 
and China’s economies are more competitive than 
complementary.
Long-Term Prospects
President Lee ran as a pro-business candidate who 
would place greater emphasis on increasing the na-
tion’s economic growth rate. The centerpiece of his 
platform included the 747 pledge on the economy: 7 
percent annual GDP growth,7 $40,000 per capita in-
come, and the 7th largest economy in the world––an 
ambitious goal that will require a signifi cant amount 
of economic reform to realize.
To achieve the 747 pledge, Korea will need to imple-
ment a series of economic reforms, of which additional 
FTAs can be one component. With that in mind, Presi-
dent Lee has expressed support for the quick passage 
of the KORUS FTA and for Korea’s proceeding with 
agreements with China, Russia, and Japan. Although 
any new administration is bound to undertake a policy 
7. President Lee’s team subsequently pared back the target for GDP growth during his fi rst year in offi ce: from 7 percent to 
6 percent.
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review, it seems unlikely that Korea would pull back 
from its FTA push during the Lee administration.
As Korea continues its FTA push, the high level of its 
FTAs will be one advantage it will have in moving 
toward becoming Northeast Asia’s FTA hub. There is 
a certain geostrategic logic to Korea’s becoming the 
region’s FTA hub. Korea has often been described 
as a shrimp trapped between two whales, yet Korea 
as the nexus for trade in Northeast Asia could help 
to stem any long-term concerns and mitigate any 
potential rivalry for such a role between China and 
Japan. China and Japan, with their relative economic 
strengths, would be unlikely to see such a development 
as threatening their regional positions.
The question is not whether Korea has the economic 
weight to be the focal point of a regional economic 
system but whether, through its fast-paced FTA policy 
and economic liberalization, Korea can serve as a cata-
lyst for a regional system of rules that both maintains 
the openness of the region and serves as a force for 
regional economic stability.
Conclusion
Korea’s FTA policy has the potential to create a free 
trade area that will address the needs of the Korean 
economy for rest of this century. If Korea is to remain 
competitive internationally, it must continue to move 
up the production ladder and, more specifi cally, move 
headlong into the services industry as other developed 
nations have. A review of Korea’s prospective FTA 
partners and the goals it has given for some of those 
agreements shows that Korea is clearly using its FTAs 
to help address this issue as well as other strategic is-
sues. If Korea successfully concludes FTAs with all of 
its prospective partners, it will have agreements with 
nations or regional trading blocs that represent more 
than 90 percent of the world’s GDP. This will present 
an immense opportunity for Korean producers and for 
Korea’s FTA partners as well.
Mr. Stangarone is the Director for Congressional 
Affairs and Trade Analysis at the Korea Economic 
Institute. The views in this article represent his own 
and not those of the Korea Economic Institute.
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